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BEHIN 0 THE CONCILlA TlON DOORS 
Settling Discrimination Complaints in Victoria 
Dominique Allen' 
The vast majority of discrimination complaints do not reach a 
substantive hearing . Most are resolved through alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR), or withdrawn or settled prio r to hearing; however. 
there is little publicly available information on the outcomes the parties 
negotiate prior to hearing. This article presents a study of settling 
discrimination complaints in Victoria based on Interviews conducted 
with participants in that process. It explores the reasons why parties 
decide to settle rather than litigate, and examines what outcome 
complainants initially seek and what they ultimately settle for. Since 
many of the findings are consistent with earlier empirical studies, the 
article concludes by canvassing recent reform options that would 
address persistent problems with anti-discrimination law and improve 
its effectiveness in addressing individual complaints and wider 
discrimination. 
Di crimination complaints are re olved in much the arne way across ustralia. 
person who believes that they have experienced unlawful discrimination can lodge a 
complaint at the statutory equality commi sion' in their juri diction or th 
Australian Human Rights Commission (AHR ). Th equality commis ion 
investigate the complaint and, jf it i within its juri dieti n, attempts to re olve the 
c mplaint - usually through conciliation. The majority of complaints .accepted by 
the equality commission are resolved at this stage. If the parties are not able to 
resolve the complaint the complainant can ask the equality COnunlsSjOll to refer it 
to th tribunal 2 wher the complaint may undergo mediation befor a full h aring. 
Most complajnt are settled withdrawn or struck out on pr cedural ground. Very 
few are decided at h aring.) Since the majority of discriminati n complaints are 
2 
3 
ominiql1e lien was r cently awarded a PhD from the Univer ity of Melbourne. This 
article is taken from her PhD thesis and draws upon research conducted for the proje t 
'Impro ing the ffectivene a Australia' Anti-discrimination Law , which was 
funded by the Australian Research Council and the Victorian quaJ Opportunity and 
Human Rights Commission. The author is grateful to Beth Gaze and Jenny Morgan for 
their valuable comments and feedback on an extended ver ion of this article, all the 
interview par1icipant Aditi rur for transcribing the interviews and th anonymous 
referee for their helpful comments. 
The tatutory ag ncy is typically identified as the Anti-Discrim ination or Equal 
Opportunity om mission Authority or Board. For ease of reference, 'equal ity 
commissiol1' i u ed to describe the agency. 
• ribunal' and 'court are used int rchangeably xcept in reference to a specific court or 
jurisdiction .. 
See further Tab1e I. 
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feSO Ived prior to hearirw: iti ' I'· b'I ''' ' b ~t."· . ' '. . . . 
" h"1 ~ _ ~,' s~a ua .. l: to go t:uHlO the concl1lation doors to 
t:xp (J e ?' lat :actor:-, may he COt1tnhutlng.lo this-. 
Tlus artlc1e presents a studyoi" ihc' . roc . ' ' .~' . . ' ." ;. . ' 
"ompiaints" 11l 'Vi' t . " b ~ 1 . - .. . " . p ess , o ..i. [.,:solvmg dlscrlIumatlon 
" , C -01 Ia aSl;l on . mtPT"<'l e U ! . . .. - -t'1 ,'., '. "', -
. . _," _ .,'... ~ . ' "P",s :\""1 1 HClOt' JaIl Equal Q . ,Otlun1~'i';- - d 
Human Rights CC)l11mlSslun (V'~()HI~("') ··"'t. f-f : . . d ." -.· .1.'., .; ... :. ' .. ».......... ., ;PP.':.>." ;. }) : ~n:,:: . 
_ e ' I" , _ .' _ . ~', .... ; .. ';: ~ • .a~ . i ,a -s~ echonuf:Q_arn5-teEs,s6 W¢itors'. 
and non J gal ad \ ocatc~ pr detl ';111 g d lsCnrntnat - l' - ' . ,, " _-, . .., '. , ... '.' ." ,., ...... ... . Victori~ as a rep.resentative mod;l o'rantl-dis~&7Jntd~t%hVl~~tt~lB~:B :Jt1?Y:r~'ie~,: 
complalIll resoiut.l011 process vary slightly acro"~ : tl"-'''' ·· --· .. ·· ·" d·': _ ·· ·: , ' ,·· ~~\:,;",>l{':' " ,:a.v..;:fm, 
. - ~. . ' . . .... '" lClHrts tctl1t)t(';;'-"The.' p·· :hr+ids'eof 
the ~111dy IS to cxammc why the vast maJ-nri'tf ' C'd";;' ·· ~ , · - · ,-' ;=r -;":.<: 
. , . " __ - '. _ ' ) Q<- lSf.:rI:rllln_arlOIl~eOtIlp,b Ilg~ ; ~cttlt::: 
outsIde the tOI mal legal sy..,tem. 1 he study' docs -not.> . · '.~ ,l;,.i h· <;''''> ' .. ''''''::, >:':" ,'.;;;:< '.";".':'.:'-" ~' :'''''': 
. " . . . ... . ,. ' . ~onSltli,:L t ,CC:Qmmlsslon,'s 
complallll- handllllg processes or cnnel1iatiuH. Thc-re i<::.a lack'o"'-f ' ,·· 'u' .. ··bli··' I: .;.>, ,,,,,, ,, .. :,, 
. c .' h' " .. ~ 1" ,,' . - . , : . > ,. ". "', p ,clyaya){able', 
lnlOnlldtton a _ om set1 eTTlcnt outCUIIli;;-, 11~ ~1~Cnn~lIlatI(Jnl~9mpl'!-ints_ in -:Yictc)tia. _:s-O:': 
the secondary purpose was to gather thiS lIliOnTI311011. 
The fu's\ sectioll presents an overview of the problc-mk-c.om:1l1ehilitO;/~l "'> 
. 1 . fi ed . 1 . d' . . . 1 '. . .... _. . . h" lave 
1( cnt.l 1 Wit 1 antl~ I:>;Cnmmatlon a\v and discllsses lhcrcs~archnlc:1JIJ;d:-6f.thl{ 
s~dy. Based on the inter~-jews condl1ct~d in \'-idoria, the l1exlsccticiilp:te~;c;~t.( ':lllJ 
pnmary reasons parhes choose to settle, and sl;ction 3 cxaminc:s -':thc -6htc'omes. 
complainants initially seck compared to what they ultimalely clbtaill. th~~- fi-iHli 
sec-tion of the article considers options available LO address the identificdp, hJhleli1~~ 
and notes that there are limits to how etfectively an inh(:['\:ntly reactlve andpas~ive 
model can addrcs:i discrimillation. . .... 
Background to the Study 
A Comparison of Discrimination Complaints in Three Jurjsdictions 
Very fe-\v dis-~rjmillaLion ~omp!aints are funnelled [rom the t:4ualiL}' cOIHmis'sion to 
Lhe- tribunal rm a substantive heming. Tile overwhelming majority arc TCSO h'cd 
through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or withdrawn or scttll:d prior to 
hearing. nlis is ShO'\.\,11 most cohercutly by comparing the number of complaints 
lodged at the equal it}· commission with the complaintt-! referred to the tri hun<ll and 
the number of decisiuns. Table 1 documents this in tlu'ce jurisdictions: V ictorja, 
Qucenshnd and r~dcrally. 
The complaint d,11a is drawn from the equality commissions' 20060-1 anuual 
reports 8nd tlihunai decisions." Tbc data arc indicative hut not compleTely reliable. " 
(, 
7 
S.;:xual harassment and vl]-itlc~~!.jOll cOLllpbin Is hw .. e not bt:ell :;I,e; d in,culL to enforce $0 
they are not considet·cd. 
II -i~ oulsidl: the scope 0 ~'lhis :<lItic-le to con$idcr how difftrence-s ~n processes may alTect 
:;eulentem·· fix instance, I.he clhsence of a specLc1]i<;[ adjudicator In Victuna compared 
with Qu{;ensl:-l.nd. See Humer and Leonard (1995), P Ill1', discus,<;ing var'iations in 
COJllp laint ·h and Jill g procts~es in lI11'ec juri sd ictions,. 
VEOHKC (2006 07); VirlOlian Ci-,,:il and Adminis(rative Tribunal (2006---07); Anli-
Di scrirninali nn (:01 n In is-sio T1 Quee.ns 1 J nd (2006 il7); 11 RrJ )C (20()(} ... 0 7): F.;:; Cler al 
Magistrdtc~ Courl of Auslra1ia (2006---D7). 
The AliRe <lIld the Quccns13nd Anti, Discrim ination Commission record complaintt: 
made ((bOll t In u !tip le attributes. multiple '!llles. To en sure Illat Lill" table cants i 11~ the 
m (l st (lCCll ra (e data, th e ti, tal n limber () r co III pIal n ts was u:-;!;d an d ~exua I harassm cnl and 
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Sexual harassment and racial hatred or vilification complaints, could not be 
extracted from all data.~ It is also difficult to match the equality commission's 
complaint inforIi1ation with the tribunal's data because the tribunal decisions' data 
relate to 2007, whereas the equality commissio~ report by financial year. Finally, 
complaint levels represent the number of complaints the equality commission 
received; they do not necessarily reflect the level of discrimination in society. 
Despite this, it is still possible to draw valuable conclusions about the process. 
Table 1: Complaint resolution, 2006-07 
Victoria Queensland Federal 
Discrinlin ation complaints 1550 562 1779 
Received by the equality 
comrmSSlOD 
Complaints referred to .conciliatiofl 37.43% 4329 38% 
Complaints resolved at conciliation Unknowi1 60% 69% 
Complaints referred to the 209 1)0 98.10 
tribunal/court 
Complaints resolved through 65% 57% Unknown! I 
mediation at the tribunal/court 
Substantive decisions (2007) 11 9 12 
The data in Table 1 show how complaints are funnelled through the system. Of 
the tota:) complaints lodged at the equality commission, a third were referred to 
conciliation and !\Vo-thirds of thos~ complaints were resolved. Because of the 
differing ways ·in which the equality commissions record complaints, it is difficult 
to trace what happens to the one-third that do not resolve at conciliation. What can 
be detennined is that~ across the three jurisdictions, only 5-19 per cent of 
complaints are referred to the tribunal each year and two-thirds of thQse complaintS 
are resolved tlrrough mediation at the tribunaL The tribunal makes relatively few 
8 
9 
10 
11 
vilification complaints were extracted where possible. Compl.aints are not considered by 
area or attribute, as the data are not comparable on that basis. 
The total number of complaints in Queensland includes 120 complaints about sexual 
hara'3sment and 17 about vilification. Sexual .harassment and racial hatred complaints 
could not be excluded from the total federal complaints. The number of co.mplaints the 
VEOHRC referred to the tribunal relating to sexual harassment or vilification was not 
stated. 
It is not possible to express this as a percentage. The Commission's annual report 
implies that this refers to all types of complaints., not only discrimination complaints. 
This is the applications reiating to discrimination matters which were filed at the 
Federal Magistrates Court, which representedl.3 per cent of application s. 
A total of 34 discriminatlon matters were referred to mediation. Of all federal law 
matters that were .mediated, mOre than 50 per cent were resolved. 
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substantive decisions each year,12 which is consistent across these jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the overwhelming majority of discrimluation complaints are not resolved 
through a hearing. 
In addition to there being few substantive decisions each year, the equality 
commissions publish limited infonnation about the outcomes reached at settlement. 
The information published by the VEOHRC is limited to some de-ipentified case 
studies in its annual report.]) The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(VeA T), which adjudicates discrimination complaints, does not release infonnation 
about settlements reached at mediation;]4 None of the Australian equality 
commissions publishes a comprehensive catalogue of annual settlements. The 
information they disseminate is limited to de-identified case studies and sample 
outcomes in their annual reports. 15 Some list examples of conciliated complaints on 
their websites. I'• 
The fact that so few discrimination complaints reach the courts might suggest 
that the complaint-resolution system is working effectively and as intended. It cou1d 
be argued that parties are aware of their rights and the decision the court is likely to 
make, so they do not need to use the formal1egal system. However, the low number 
of decided cases is not new to anti-discrimination law; it characterises the 
legislation's history in many jurisdictions. For instance~ in 1993 in New South 
Wales, Thornthwaite [OUIld that an average of 6 per cent of employment 
discrimination cOlnpl~ints were referred to the tribunal during the legislation's first 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Most deci siol1s relate to procedural applications, such as costs and strike-out 
applications. 
VHREOC (2006-07), pp 25~30. Other than this, the information available about 
-complaints is limited to statis:~ics: about the attribute. ar:ea~ gender of the complainant 
and type of respondent. Information is also provided about the number of compiaints 
received, the number finalised and the time taken to finalise them. 
The exception to this is jf the Tribunal makes orders giving effect to the settlement 
reached by the partIes: Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act J 998 (Vic), 
s 93(1). It did not do so during 2006-08. 
Some are more extensive than others - for example, HREOC (2006-(7), pp 55-63; 
Western Australia Equal Opportunity Commission (2006-07), App A; ACT Human 
Rights Commission (2006-O7)~ pp 21-22; South Australia Equal Opportunity 
Commission (2006-07). Cf the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board (2006--07). The 
Tasmanian Office of the Anti-Discrimination Comniissioner does not include any. 
Some include information about cases heard by the tribunal: Anti-Discrimination 
Commission Queensland (2006~07), pp 30-31; Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination 
Commission (2006-07), p 19. 
The Western Australia Equal Opportunity Commission has a Conciliated Complaints 
Register, which briefly summarises a selection of conciliated complaints: 
www.equaloppDrtunity.wa.goy.au)discrimination.html#ccomplaints. The Tasmanian 
Office of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner's website includes a table of examples 
of conciliated complaints, one for each ground: www.antidiscrimiriation.tas.gov.au/ 
Complaint_ Handling_Process/conciliationconference;o:;/concil iated ~ outcomes. The 
AHRC publishes. a Condliation Register on its website, which contains information 
about a selection of complaints, including the de-identified facts and out~omes: 
www.hreoc.gov.au/complain ts _infonnation/registerlindex.htm LF or South Australia., 
see. www.eoc.sa.gov.au/site/eo _resources/complain t_ swnm aries.jsp. 
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decade. The majority of complaints concluded at conciliation wered,ismissed by the 
tribunal or resolved privately. n Hunter and Leonard reached a sirnilar conclusion in 
their study of sex discrimination complaints in three jurisdictions in 1989-93.'~ This 
makes it harder to maintain the argument that the law is actually working, Instead, it 
suggests that the law is not operating as intended~ and there is a shortage of 
substantive decisions because complainants are disinclined to use the formal legal 
system to resolve their complaint. 
Problems with Anti~Djscrjmination Laws 
Commentators have identified significant problems with the law that may explain 
the lack of decisions. Courts have interpreted the substantive law technically and 
restrictively, making it difficult for the complainant to estilblish discrimination. I'! 
The complainant bears the onus of proof in most situations, ~o which exacerbates the 
interpretive problems. It is difficult for the complainant to meet their burden,21 
especially in race discrimination complaints. ~1 The direct evidence needed to prove 
discrimination is usually in the respondent's possession, so the' complainant must 
rely on circumstantial evidence and ask the court to draw an inference of 
discrimination. Courts are reluctant to do this in the absence of cogent evidence,ZJ 
and they regularly subject evidence to the higher standard required by Briginshaw v 
Briginshaw.H In many jurisdictions, the complainant risks a costs order against 
them if litigation is unsuccessful. 25 Since discriminatiop complainants do not 
generally qualify for Legal Aid funding, the complainant is unlikely to have 
representation.~~ Respondents are more likely to have legal representation and they 
have challenged unfavourable decisions at first instance j which has genqated a 
body of case law decided in their favour. il Furthermore, while conciliation is 
attractive because it is a cost-effective, flexible and expedient way to resolve legal 
disputes compared with litigation, there are problems with using conciliation to 
resolve discrimination complaints. Conciliation may reinforce the power 
17 
la 
19 
20 
21 
21 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Thomtbwaite (1993), pp 40-45. 
Hunter and LeonaI'd (1995), p 22. 
A n9tableexample 1$ Purvis v New South Wales [2003] 211 CLR 92. See ~lso Thornton 
(1995); .Gaze (2002}, p 340ff; Tahmindjis (1995). 
The complainant bears the onus of proof in Victoria and in most AustraEan 
jurisdictions. The exceptions are indirect discrimination in Queenslan~ and federal sex 
and age indirect discrimination complaints: Antl.-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), ss 204, 
205; Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 7C; Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), 
s 15(2). See further Allen (2009a), pp 58~87. . 
Gaze (2005), pp 190-94; Rajapakse (1998); Thornton (1995). 
Hunyor (2003); Gaze (2005). 
Hunyor (2003), pp 540, 548-51. 
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. Hunyor (2003), pp 539--40; De Plevitz 
(20.03). 
Gaze (2005), pp 181~82. 
Gaze (2000),pp 127-29. 
See Gaze's discussion of this· in the federaljuosdiction: Gaze (200.0), p 126. 
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imbalances between the parties to the complainant's detriment. 2~ If th~re are lawyers 
involved, they may exacerbate power imbalances .- particularly if they engage in 
aggressive, adversarial behaviour. 2Q Confidentiality, while often necessary to get the 
parties to the negotiating table,w is disadvantageous because it restricts the available 
infonnation about the conciliatiOIi process and settlement outcomes, meaning later 
conciliation participants do not have access to information about outcomes which, 
for an unrepresented complamant, could put them in a disadvantaged position.31 
Confidentiality also masks the extent to which discrlmination remains a problem in 
society.J2 Finally, anti-discrimination law relies art the individual for enforcement. 
Although some equality commissions can participate in litigation, they are 
principally concerned with complaint handling and conciliation. 
Research Method 
Empirical studies of discrimination complaints have focused on a ground or area of 
discrimination/:l the conciliation process~4 or analysed the impact of a particular 
aspect of the law on discrimination comp laints :~, The methods employed were: 
interviewing equality commission staff and parties to complaints;>" observing 
cortciliations;37 exammmg complaint files;·'~and exammmg tile equality 
commissions' complaint-handling methods.'9 Some studies explored settlement 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
31'1 
39 
Hunter and Leonard (1995), p 1, n 3. 
Gonzalez and McCabe (2003), p 9 note that lawyers change 'the dynamics' of 
conciliation because they are used to operating in an adversarial model and this may 
create a hostile environment. Further, sinc.e they need to cover their costs, they may also 
be inclined to seek financial settlements. Similarly, Thornton (1989, p 756 says that 
lawyers, by nature and training. find it difficult to sit back and let the partks take 
control of the conciliation process. 
Thornton (1989), p 740 says that without the protection of confidentiality, respondents 
would not be prepared to be labelled as wrongdoers and complainants may be deterred 
from lodgirig a complaint. 
Thornton (1989), p 741. 
Hunter and Leonard ( 1995), p I. 
Hunter and Leonard (1995) examined sex discrirn.ination; Chapman and Mason (1999) 
looked at sexuality discrimination and vilification complaints; and Charlesworth and 
Macdonald (2007) studied pregnancy discrimination. 
Thornton (1989); Hunter and Leonard (1995). 
Chatlesworth and Macdonald (2007) evaluated the impact of changes (0 federal 
industrial relatlons law; Gaze and Hunter (2008) examined the impact of the changes to 
the AHRC's hearing function. 
Hunter and Leonard (1995); Charlesworth and Macdonald (2007); Gazeanq Flunter 
(2008). 
Thornton (1989). 
Thornton (1989); Thointhwaite (1993); Hunter and Leonard (1995); Chapman and 
Mason (1999); Chapman (2000). 
Thornton (1989); Chapman (2000). 
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outcomes, bu~ they did so by examining the equality commission~s complaint files,«l 
which are not always comprehensive.41 
The empirical research presented in this article was collected as part of a larger 
study on the effectiveness of anti-discrimination laws;H so data were collected about 
the full spectrum of the complaint-resolution process in Victoria. The parameters of 
this article are confined to: reporting the findings of tile questions pertaining to the 
reasons why the vast majority of complaints settle prior to hearing; the outcome 
complainants seek; and what complaints are ultimately settled for. Some of the 
difficulties with defining and proving discrimination were identified above. In order 
to ascertain the degree to which the problems with proving discrimination are 
influencing settlement, barristers were asked about this. 
This article does not deal with the VEOHRC's complaint~handling procedures, 
conciliation or hearings at the YCAT, except to the extent that the p~icipants 
identified that these processes influence a party's decision to s.ettle. The research 
method used was to obtain qualitative information from participants" in the 
complaint-resolution process:in Victoria through focus groups and interviews. The 
VEOHRC participated as an industry partner of the larger study. Its participation 
included allowing staff to participate in interviews and identifying lawyers and non-
legal advocates who regularly represent parties at the VEOHRC and inviting them 
to "participate. Members of three groups were interviewed: VEOHRC staff of 
various occupations, who are referred to collectively as 'VEOHRC staff and by 
their occupation where relevant; solicitors and non-legal advocates who regularly 
represent parties to discrimination complaints at the VEOHRC; and barristers who 
are reg"i.llarly briefed in discrimination cases. The latter two groups are referred to 
collectively as 'representatives', and by their occupation and the party they most 
often represent where relevant. The participants are summarised in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2: VEOHRC StatI 
Occupation 
CO"lIlm:ission member 
Comp lain t handler 
Investigator Iconciliator 
Manager 
Lega] staff 
Total participants 
3 
7 
9 
4 
4 
27 
40 Thornto:n (1989); Thornthwaite (1993); Hunter and Leonard (1995); Devereux (1996); 
Chapman and Mason (1999). 
41 
42 
Thomthwaite (1993), pp33-34, 40. Chapman and Mason (1999), p 526. 
ARC Linkage Project Grant (no. LP0455754) on <Improving the Effectiveness of 
Australia's Anti-Discrimination Laws'. 
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Table 3: Representatives _. Party Most Often Represented 
Party Solicitors Advocates Barristers 
Complainant 6 2 3 
~~oo~ 8 I I 
Both parties 3 
Total 14 3 7 
It was not possible to interview parties to discrimination complaints. This was 
primarily due to restrictions in the confidentiality agreements the parties sign when 
they settle a complaint. It was the opinion of staff at the VEOHRC that this is 
drafted in such a way that it restricts the parties' ability to discuss any aspect of the 
complaint, including anonymously. 41 
The study has some limitations. First, the group of representatives interviewed 
was narrow. Not every discrimination representative in Victoria was invited to 
participate. The VEOHRC invited 32 representatives who regularly represent 
parties at the commission to participate. Two of those representatives and a barrister 
identified barristers who regularly rcpresellt parties in discrimination matters and 
had professional experience directly relevant to the research. Twenty-Jour barristers 
were invited to participate. Therefore, although their comments are illustrative, they 
cannot "be considered representative of discrimination lawyers and non-legal 
advocates .. Second, representatives deal with parties wbohave received some form 
of legal advice, so their comments about why parties settle and what they settle for 
must be read wjth this in mind. The views of the VEOHRC staff shed some light on 
why those without legal advice decide to settle. However, further direct research of 
parties is needed to form any meaningful conclusions about their motivations. 
Third, the interview questions were designed to explore the participants' opinions 
and experience, so the data have no quantitative power. The purpose Qf the data is 
to provide qualitative evidence about settlement and outcomes. Fourth, it is 
acknowledged that one of the problems with relying on anecdotal evidence is that 
its accuracy cannot reliably be tested. For this reason, the interview data are 
supplemented by other available mfonnation about settlements in Victoria. 
43 This was a problem in the past. Two decades ago, confi.dentiality clauses prevented 
thornton from undertaking a full-scale empirical study of conciliation in anti-
discrimination complaints in New South Wales, Victoria and South Austra1ia: Thornton 
(1989), p 733, n 30. Two recent studies obtained inf-onnat"ion from parties to complaints, 
albeit for quite different purposes from this study. Charlesworth and Macdonald (2007) 
conducted intervIews with female sex discrimination complainants, but their purpose 
was to identify the difficulties experi·enced by Victorian women w.orkers before, during 
and after taking maternity leave and to identify whether the changes to the federal 
industrial relations law had c;:xacerbated those difficulties. Gaze and Hunter (200S.) 
interviewed parties to federal discrimination complaints, but the purpose of their study 
was to assess the impact of the new system for hearing federal discrimination 
complaints. 
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Why Do Parties Settle Before Hearing? 
The majority of discrimination complaints are resolved at some point prior to 
hearing, either formally at conciliation or mediation, or infonnally through 
discussions between the parties and their representatives. This section expl"ores the 
common reasons why parties decide to settle rather than pursue their complaint. 
Psychological ReaSons 
In deciding whether to setde a complaint, according to a barrister, complainants 
consider the emotional and psychological toll of pursuing the complaint, 
particularly on those who are vulnerable: it may not be in their best interest to 
continue pursuing it or to embark on 3 trial. A complainant barrister said that 
complainants can be anxious about giving evidence about an unpleasant time ill 
their life and the possibility of being extensively cross-examined. The time lag 
between the incident and the trial is also a consideration. By the time a complaint 
reaches the VCATo it could be up to J 2 months since the complaint was lodged. 
There will have been a long interva1 betwccn the incident itself and the hearing 
date. By the time of mediation, representatives said, parties have moved on with 
their lives ~ for example, to a new job - while others are 'sick of if and 'worn 
down' or they have ·cooled off and are more agreeable to settlement offers. 
Publicity 
The publicity of a hearing Was identified as a primary consideration for 
respondents. Conciliators thought that this was particularly so for employers. Two 
respondent representatives sajd that the.ir clients settled to avoid what one termed 
the 'page three factor' - to avoid the details of the complaint being sp.lashed 'all 
over page three of the Herald Sun'. Another respondent representative said that the 
media often distorted the facts and printed <horrible stuff' about the parties 
concerned. Respondents also settle because they can insist on a cO:!1fidentiality 
clause., which prevents the complainant from discussing the details of the complaint 
and the terms of settlement. Conciliators said respondents usually sought 
confidentiality clauses as a matter of course. One said re:spondents emphasised the 
importance of confidentiality during conciliation - particularly employers, who 
require a confidentiality clause to limit their liability against other potential 
complaints. 
Financial Considerations 
All representatives identified the cost of a hearing as a significant factor for both 
sides in deciding to settle. A union advocate said the union funded its members' 
representation at conciliation but could not fund them to go further because it was 
too expensive and there was the risk of costs, Complainant representatives said that 
their clients feared the consequences of not settling; if they ran the case and lost, 
they would have accrued costs and could be subje.ct to a costs order, but ev·en if 
they were successful, the tri?unal may award them less incompensation than they 
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could have negotiated earlier.44 The veA T'·s compensation awards were described 
as being 'out of step' with what complainants can negotiate at settlement. For 
example, a complainant barrister had recently settled three complaints for 
compensation on par with the award in State of Victoria v McKenna, which was 
$125,000 in general damages. 45 McKenna remains a high watermark for 
compensation awards in Victoria. During 2006-08, the VCAT awarded 
compensation in six of the eight complaints in which discrimination was proven.% 
Although the awards ranged from to $2,000 to $83,368.83, the median 
compensation award was only $19,843.~1 
By settling beforehand, the complainant receives some money that does not 
dissipate in legal fees. A complainant barrister said that they could give the 
comp.lainant a definite cost for their fees up to the time of settlement, which may 
only be a couple of days of their time, whereas it is difficult to predict the cost of 
litigation. A respondent barrister s<;I.id that after mediation the real costs start to 
accrue for preparing wi1ness statements, outlining arguments and allowing for time 
spent in the hearing. The complainant also considers the inequality of their 
resources compared with the respondent's. A complainant barrister recalled two 
complaints, both involving trials that ran for over four weeks. In each instance, the 
respondent was a state government department that spent over $1 million on the 
trial. including on expert witnesses .• while the complainant's barrister 'begged' 
experts to appear pro bono. 
VEOHRC staff thought that, for many respondents, settling the complaint was 
a commercial decision. Some respondent representatives also identIfied this asa 
reason. They said that they advised their clients that settling was the best way to 
make the complaint' go away'. The commeJ;cial considerations that they identified 
were the cost of defending the complaint, both in terms of legal fees and the lost 
productivity of the staff who had to deal with it, and the time and energy involved 
in defending the complaint. However, representatives said that there were other 
respondents who were prepared to 'call the complainant's bluff'. They judge 
whether the complainant has the money to puisue the complaint and take the risk 
44 
45 
46 
47 
If the complainant is successful, the VCAT can still order the complainant to pay the 
respondent's costs which were inc~rred after a settlement offer was made in writing that 
the complainatitrejected, provided they received an order from the Tribunal that was 
less favourable than the respondent's offer: Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Act 1998 (Vic\ s 1] 2. 
State of Victoria v McKenna [1999] VSC 310. The award was to compensate the 
complainant for stress on her priVate and working life and pain and suffering: McKenna 
v State of Victoria [1998] VADT 83. It should be noted that sexual harassment was 
proven, as well as sex discrimination. Sexual harassment complaints typically receive 
higher compensation awards than discrimination complaints. 
Deckert v Victorian Institute of Dryland Agriculture [2006] VCAT 299; Beasley v State 
of Victoria [2006] VCAT 1050; Morgan v Dancen Enterprises Pty Ltd [2006J VCAT 
2145; King v Nike Australia Pty Ltd [2007J VCAT 70~ Duma v Mader international Pty 
Ltd [2007J VCAT 2288; TumervStateojVictoria [2008] VCAT 161. 
the complainant in Tumerreceived the second highest compensation award during that 
period ($S2,OOO). On appeal, this was reduced to $50,500: State of Victoria v Turner 
[2009] VSC 66_ 
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that the complainant will not refer the complaint to veAT, knowi:ng that even if 
they do, they can settle at mediation. 
Proof and Evidence 
Complainant and respondent representatives acknowledged that even strong cases 
settle, not only those that may be unsuccessful at hearing. Respondents facing a 
complaint that will be costly to defend" such as those requiring a lengthy hearing, 
are advised to settle. A respondent representative said that they would advise their 
client to settle if the complainant was not represented and wanted to admit 
irrelevant material as evidence because the respondent would accrue costs disputing 
its relevance. 
A complainant barrister said that the problems with being able to prove a case 
'are infinite'. Another complainant barrister desc"rlbed the process of putting 
together a case as 'being able to really machete your way through' all the issues to 
get to 'the nub' of what the complaint is actually about. A barrister said the 
defmitions of discrimination are sometimes difficult to work with, particularly 
flying to fit the facts within the law and to frame the particulars accordingly. 
Several barristers said that they tended not to take a complaint to hearing unless it 
was significant, due to difficulties of proving it. A complainant barrister thought 
that discrimination had become more subtle and, unless the respondent was 'stupid 
enough' to send derogatory emails or say something in front of witnesses, it was 
difficult to prove what had actually happened. Another complainant barrister said 
that the reason most discrimination cases are hard to prove is because direct 
evidence is either not available or not accessible. they said establishing 'causation' 
in a direct discrimination compiaint4K is problematic: they will have a client who 
was treated unfairly and the only reason the client can identify is anattribute~ ~ut 
the respondent will provide an explanation which seems valid. It is then difficult for 
the complainant's barrister to prove that the actual reason for the behaviour was the 
attribute. Another problem is the unavailability of witnesses_ A complainant 
barrister explained that, in an employment discrimination complaint,. they may have 
to rely upon witnesses who are still employed by the respondent and are anxious 
about jeopardising their own position. A related problem is the disparity in the 
amount of evidence adduced by each side. A complainant barrister provided an 
example ofa client who had one witness while the respondent had fOUT, and in 
·art.other case, the complainant was aged just 10 and was confronted py a -respondent 
with 20 witnesses. 
Consequences of Predominantly Settling Discrimination Complaints 
Parties settle discrimination c:omplaints .to avoid the difficulties associated with 
litigation~ cost, time, energy and public.ity. A complicating factor is that this is not a 
jurisdiction where high compensation awards are common, so complainants may 
decide to settle earlier to avoid the expense of continuing. It is not possible to fonn 
48 To establish direct discrimination. the complainant must shi;">w that the reason for the 
treatment was 'on the basis of' a prohihited attribute which they possess. See, for 
example, Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), s 7. 
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strong conclusions about the extent to whkhthe difficUlties of proving 
discrimination are a reason for settling. Representatives cit~d thea.bs~ce of 
accessible evidence "and the technical definitions as problemati"c "~"~"" which supports 
the contentions made by other commentators about the "difficulties with proving 
discrimination.4') It can be inferred that difficulties with proving discrimination arc 
Less likely to be a consideration for parties without legal advice. 
The reasons for settling complaints cited above are common to other areas of 
law. What is unique to this jurisdiction is that the body of jurispruci:ence is under-
developed. Anti-discrimination law "has received little consideration from higher 
courts, 5~ so lower courts and tribunals have little guidance about how to apply and 
interpret the law. This, in turn, affects the complaint-resolution process: the eq1jality 
commissions and lawyers have little au:thori:ty for interpreting the law, l1leanlng 
they are less certain about how the court would decide a complaint~ while potential 
respondents and the wider community do not know what compliance requires. 
Therefore, pressures common to litigation are seen as having an undesirable effect 
on the development of anti-discrimination law because the lack of litigated cases is 
impeding its growth. 
For these reasons, Fiss is against settlement. This is because, unlike litigation, 
he says settlement denies the court the opportunity to interpret the relevant statute: 
To be against settlement is only to suggest that when the parties settle, 
~9ciety gets less :than what appears, and for a price it does not know it is 
paying. Parties might settle while leaVing justice undone. 51 
Fiss's concern is most apparent when oonsidering the objective of anti-
discrimination law: to address discrimination and promote equality of opportunity.s~ 
There is no scope to discuss these concepts in detail, but if equality of opportunity 
"is taken at its broadest, then the law's objective is social change. Certainly there are 
commentators who are sceptical about how effectively the law - and, by 
extension, the courts - can change social structures,53 but it can be concluded that 
if the legislature intended :anti-discrimination law to have broader, remedial effect, 
then the fact that there are few publicly decided cases each year is detrimental to 
that objective. This problem is exacerbated by the confidentiality of the conciliation 
process and individualised settlements. The final section of this article comments 
further on this. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
See Hunyor (2003), pp 540, 548-51; Gaze (2005). 
The High Court has substantively considered anti-discrimination law oil only seven 
OCC8SlOns. 
Fiss (1984), P 1085. 
It is an objective of the laws in Victoria, the ACT. Qu~ensland, the Northern Territory 
and Western Austra1 ia. 
See~ for examp1e, Lustgarten (l986)~ Bell (1992). 
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What Do Complainants Want? 
This section presents data about what complainants initially seek when they make a 
complaint, compared with what they ultimately settle for. This is c.ompared with 
settlement data from other research conducted in Victoria. 
Outcomes Complalnants Seek 
Complaint handlers said that when a complainant approaches the VEOHRC about 
making a complaint, often they have not identified what they want from the 
process. A complaint handler said that during the initial stages the complainant is 
emotional~ which makes it difficult for them to identifY a tangible outcome. They 
said complainants wished that the conduct had not happened but do not know how 
to renledy it. A complaint handler spoke of complainants who expect staff to tell 
them what they should ask for, based on what those in similar situations have 
negotiated previously. Rather than advising them, complaint handlers said that they 
suggested what outcomes the complainant could consider. They concurred that the 
most common suggestions they made were equal opportunity training, a reference 
(tenned a 'statement of service') and an apology. If there are lost wages to be 
compensated, they suggest financial compensation. 
Non-Financial Outcomes 
Representatives said th~t for many complainants, talking about their experience, 
bringing it to the respondent's attention and having what a respondent 
representative described as a 'cath~rtjc experience' are sufficient to remedy the 
discrimmation. For others, it is about 'the principle', and representatives find this 
rnuchmore difficult to remedy because respondents are often reluctant to admit 
they were wrong. Therefore, remcdyin.g the principle tends to mean seeking 
compensation because, as many representatives acknowledged, that is how the law 
remedies a wrong. As a respondent representative said) 'principles are really 
expensive things'. 
Other representatives attempt to be creative in what they negotiate. A 
complainant barrister thought it was important to fmd <the keys' for each 
complainant -" which are not always financiaL By doing this, they said, 
compensation is not always an issue because they have found alternate ways to 
remedy the wrong. A complainant representative said they are creative in the 
outcome they negotiate. They try to fmd an appropriate way of acknowledging the 
experience for each individual complainant. This may include money in a different 
fonn, slfch as a Laptop or a week's paid holiday. A respondent representative said 
they had negotiated career cO"llnselling services as part of a settlement to help the 
comp1ainant find another job. 
Compensation 
Complaint handlers said complainants were reluctant, and sometimes embarrassed, 
to talk about compensation at first, and the dollar figure they place on the complaint 
ALLEN: BEHIND THE CONCILIA TlON DOORS 791 
can be unrealistic.~4 Representatives agreed that complainants seek large amounts of 
compensation initially. For example, a respondent representative recalled a 
complainant who sought $27,000 from a local council, but the respondent thought 
the complaint was only worth $5,000. The complaint settled at mediation for 
$8,000. 
A complainant barrister said the amount of compensation the complainant 
seeks sometimes reflects their need for acknowledgment: a higher amount is a 
higher degree of acknowledgment, whereas a lower amount is seen as an insult. A 
complainant representative said that unless there is a monetary component to the 
settlement, the respondent does not take the· matter seriously. In assessing an 
appropriate amount of compensation to seek, they detennine the respondent's 'pain 
factor' -. a dollar amount that the respondent will feel- which varies according to 
the respondent employer's size and financial situation. 
Wide; Outcomes 
Representatives and VEOHRC staff referred to some instances of complainants 
seeking remedies which benefitted other people, and said that this depended on the 
type of complaint. For example, for complaints relating to goods and services or 
accommodation~ complainants usually want something fixed - such as access to a 
building - so that others do not h·ave to experience what they did. A representative 
from a disability advocacy group, who often represents complainants~ said that they 
include specialised trainmg programs in settlements - for example, disability 
awareness training or training from a relevant provider, such as the MS Society if 
the complainant suffers from multiple sClerosis. Employment complaints are 
different. Few complainants who have left their job will seek reinstatement, 
primarily because the relationship has broken down, so compensation is the only 
useful remedy. Those who are still employed may seek an aiTangement for the 
relationship going fonvard, such as changing a roster or work hours. However, this 
is usually converted to compensation because that is <easier' for employers to agree 
to, compared with having to address the underlying problem. 
Settlement 
The information about settlement outcomes presented thus far suggests that 
compensation is. the predominant outcome sought because it is the primary way the 
law can redress the complainant's experience. The exception is complaints about 
disability access, where a change in practice is usually sought. This section explores 
what parties settle for by comparing other available settlement data to the 
qualitative information obtained in this study. 
VEOHRC Settlement Information 
In her study of sex and gender employment discrimination complaints lodged at the 
VEOl-lRC in the frrst three months of 2004, Charlesworth found that, in 17 of the 
22 compl~ints in the sample that settled) the settlement involved financial 
54 A number of complaints handlers and representatives said that complainants expected 
equivalent sums to what they had seen on American television programs. 
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compensation. The median settlement was $3,000. Five settlements involved an 
apoiogy, and in six the respondent agreed to provide or renew equal opportunity 
education and training. 55 
Conciliation settlements negotiated at the VEOHRC during 2006-07 were 
published by the govemment/~ as reproduced in Table 4. 
Table 4: VEOHRC Conciliation Outcomes, 2006-07 
Outcome 
Money (total $455,923) 
Resolved 
Money/apology 
Apology 
Money/statement of service 
Apology/counselling 
Money/apology/reinstated 
Apology/statement of service 
Policy change/money discount 
Statement of service 
Money/working group established 
Total 
No. of settlements 
47 
20 
7 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
I 
I 
1 
89 
Over 67 per cent of the settlements in Table 4 included compensation. The 
average compensation settlement w~s $9,700.49. Almost 18 per cent included .an 
apology as part of the settlement. Equal opportunity training does not feature in this 
sample of outcomes, and only five settlements included a statement of service. 
There is no available infonnation about the type of complaints to which these 
settlements related. 
Compensation is the predominant feature of settlements in both sets of data. 
Apologies featured in 29 per cent of Charlesworth 's sample and 18 per cent of the 
VEOHRC's data. The frequency of apologies in these settlements contrasts with the 
experience of representatives, as discussed below. Thi.s data also suggests that, 
recently, training has not featuted in settlements. Thirty-five per cent of settlements 
in Charlesworth's sample included equal opportunity education and training, but 
training did not feature in the VEOHRC's settlement data about complaints settled 
three years later. 
Apologies 
Complainants seek apologIes, according to a complainant representative, in 99.9 per 
cent of complaints. However, a genuine apology is rarely given. According to a 
complainant barrister, those who get an apology get one that does not have real 
'teeth' once it has been 'legalled'. Another complainant barrister said that most 
apologies <are not worth the paper they're written on'. Complainants receive what 
55 
56 
Charlesworth (2008), p 17. 
Department of Justice (Victoria) (2007), p 12. 
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two representatives termed 'the EO apology' - the respondent apologlses for 
upsetting the complainant but does not admit liability. A Gomplainant representative 
said that discouraged their clients from pursuing what they considered would 
ultimately be a forced apology. A respondent representative recalled an unusual 
instance when a respondent apologised voluntarily. 
Compensation 
Several conciliators said that, by the time of conciliation, many complainants will 
have abandoned the non-monetary outcomes. They said conciliation can still fajl for 
other reasons, but it will not fail because the respondent has not agreed to training 
or an apology. A conciliator said during the process the outcome sought tends to 
'drift into compensation'. A representative described it as <defaulting to 
compensation'. They said the non-economic components of the settlement are 
converted to a dollar amount, or they are discarded. A conciliator said that most of 
the conciliation time is spent coming up with an acceptable dollar figure. The 
majority of conciliators and representatives agreed tbat money was the ~sticking 
point' at conciliation and that very few compiaints settle without money changing 
hands. A respondent representative said that • everything else goes away if the 
money's right'. 
Conciliators said that if the complainant has a lawyer, there will be a fin~cial 
component to their settlement so that the complainant can pay their legal fees. 
Similarly, a respondent representative said that the amount of compensatic)n 
increases as the complainant's costs increase. By the time the complaint undergoes 
mediation at the veAT, at a minimum the complainant wiil have accrued costs for 
the directions hearing arid drafting particulars and witness statements. A 
complainant representative said their fees would be approximately $3,000-$5,000 
by the time of mediation, but for other representatives their fees could be $IO~OOO. 
Settlements and the Dominance of Compensation 
One of the benefits ofADR compared with litigation is that a variety of outcomes 
can be negotiated which may not be available to a court; The above discussion 
suggests that this is no~ occurring. Although complainants begin by seeking wider 
remedies, which are not always fmancial, the settlement outcome defaults to 
compensation. The available data from the VEOHR(: support this assertion. 
Moreover, other studies have found a similar trend. Chapman and Mason examined 
discrimination and vilification complaints lodged by women on the basis of 
homosexuality in New South Wales. Of the nine that settled, financial 
compensation featured in six of the settlements and the median compensation award 
was $4,000. The next most common outcomes were a change in policy/practice and 
an apology, wbich featured in four settleml;:nts.57 Hunter and Leonard examined 76 
sex discrimination complaints that settled in South Australia, Victoria and federally. 
An apology was the most frequent term of settlement, but this was very closely 
57 Complaints may have been settled with more than one of the listed outcomeS: Chapman 
and Mason (1999), pp 560---{) I. 
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followed by changes in policy and financial cmnpensation.S8 The cl)rrent study 
suggests that compen~ation is prevalent because in many instances it is the only 
way to remedy the complainant's experience. Most complaints relate to 
eIllployment.5Q Reinstatement may be inappropriate and the complainant may need 
to recover lost wages. 
Without statistical data from the VEOHRC and VCAT, it is not possible to 
draw conclusions about the amount of compensation for which complaints settle. fill 
From the VEOHRC's publjshed settlement data, it is onl~ possible to determine the 
average compensation settlement, which was $9,700.49 .. I In Charlesworth's study, 
compensation ranged from $48 to $20,000. More than nine awards were for $3,000 
or· less. 62 The data from legal representatives suggest that, due to the disparity 
between settlclllents and court .orders, complainants have little incentive to pursue 
the complaint to hearing. The settlement data Charlesworth obtained revealed a 
median comgensation award of $3,000 for sex and gender complaints in 
employment. 3 The median compensation award at VCAT during 2006-08 was 
$19,843.64 This does not reveal a disparity, although it is far from conclusive given 
that Charlesworthts data were limited to sex and gender complaints over a three-
month period. Without additional data, it is not possible to determine conclusively 
the disparity between compensation settlements and yeA T awards. What can be 
concluded is that by settling, the complainant avoids the costs associated with 
litigation, which they may otherwise have to deduct ·from their compensation 
award. 05 
Options for Improvement 
This study has illuminated two aspects of settling discrimination complaints: the 
disadvantages of litigation are having an undesirable effect on the development of 
anti-discrimination law by encouraging parties to settle; and, in general~ complaints 
are settled with individualised remedies. Many of the findings in this study are 
consistent with earlier studies. The reason for this is· that, structurally, anti-
discrimination laws remain much the same today as when they were introduced up 
to 30 years ago; even though there are problems. Furthermore, the individual 
58 
S9 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65· 
Their frequency in settlements was 30.5 per cent, 29.8 per cent and 29.4 per cent 
respectively: Hunter and Leonard (1995), p 18. 
1,128 of the complaints received by the VEOHRC in 2006-07 related to employment: 
VEOHRC (2006--07), P 36. 
The VEOHRC was not able to supply these data during the research project: email from 
Chris Thwaites, VEOHRC, to Dominique Allen, 26 September 2008. 
Table 4. 
Charlesworth (2008), p 17. 
Charlesworth (200S), p 17. 
See note 47. 
VeA T is empowered to award costs (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 
1998 (Vic), s 109), but of the eightsucce.ssful discrimination cases during 2006-()8, it 
awaTded the complainant costs in only one: Mangan v Melbourne Cricket Club [2006] 
YCAT73. 
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enforcement model :itse1f is lim:itedin ho·w ·effectively it can tackle disadvantage. 
The purpose of the final part of the artiCle is to canvass some options for addressing 
these problems based on recent inquiries and.models operating in other.countries." 
Previously, it was illustrated. that there is little publicly available information 
about settlements in most jurisdictions and none in Victoria. This is a pro:blcm for 
future complainants and the wider community. A simple way to improve this is to 
increase the aJllount of information available about settlements.;;- Comparably, :more 
information is available to complainants in other countries. For example, the Irish 
Equality Tribunal publishes a de-identified annual review of significant and novel 
aspects of mediation settlements. (.~ It also publishes an annual review of cases, 
highlighting those that interpreted fundamental legal concepts., ffl 
There are also pro.blems with the enforcement model: it is privatised, which 
masks the extent to which discrimination exists and does not deter would-be 
discriminators, and discrimination is predominantly resolved with individualised 
remedies, usually compensation, which does not address wider discrimination by 
requiring the respondent to take action. The equality commissiolllS not active in 
enforcement: its primary concerns are complaints handling and conciliation. An 
alternative approach is to offer complainants direct access to court with optional 
conciliation. This is the model in Britain and Northern lreland/o and it was recently 
recommended for Victoria.71 In these countries~ conciliatimi is separate from the 
equality commission, so the equality commission can advise and assist 
complainants and engage in strategic enforcement of anti-discrimination law.72 
There is not scope here to examine these jurisdictions further/:l only to identify 
some of the benefits of changing the process. Primarily, it is flexible .-
complainants who want their 'day in court' could start proceedings without delay, 
while those who want to resolve their .complaint quickly and jnformally CQuid 
attempt conciliation. Through assisting complainants, the equality commission 
could develop the law and negotiate wider remedies, like its overseas counterparts. 
Giving the equality commission a strong enforcement role also signifies that the 
state considers addressing discrimination to be in the public's interest,14 Smith 
recommends more extens.ive changes. She proposes changing the regulatory mqde I 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
For detailed analysis of these measures, .see Allen (2009h). Comparative studies of 
enf-orcemerit include HeppTe et al (2000); O'Cinneide (2002); SterilIight (2004). 
The Department of justice (Victoria) (2008) recommended that both the VEOHRC arid 
VCAT disseminate de-identified settlement information: Recommendations 29 and 31. 
See, "for example, Equality Tribunal (2007a). 
See, for example, Equality Tribunal (2007b). 
Although conciliation is only available for employment related complaints and non-
employment disability complaints in Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Department of Justice (Victoria) (2OQ8)~ Recommendation 24. 
NOlle of the n;cent inquiries have considered changing tbeenforcement model, although 
the Senate recommended a separate lnquiry into this issue: Senate Legislative and 
General Purpose Standing Committee (2008); Recommendation 43. 
On the enforcement work of the British equality commissions, see O'Brien (2005); 
Barnard (1995). 
Dickens (2007)~ p 475. 
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so that the equality commission better reflects other regulators, such as occupational 
health and safety regulators. Most significandy! she proposes arming the equality 
commission with stronger enforc.errient powers and empowering jt to purSue a range 
of escalating orders against a non-compliant rcspondent,75 Whether the equality 
commission engages in strategic enforcement by assisting complaints or aSSlUnes a 
regulatory role, the onus .of addresslng discrimination would no longer rest solely 
Oil the individuaL These proposals require further consideration if the law's 
effectiveness is to be improved. 
The problems discussed in this article also highlight three characteristics of the 
individual enforcement model: it is passive, retrospective and reactive. The law 
does 110t pre-erupt discriminatory hehaviour; rather, it offers a resolution after the 
fact, and there is no obligation for employers or service providers to take 
anticipatory action to address policies or practices that could disadvantage certain 
groups. Of this model, O'Cinneide says it 'relies excessively on an approach that 
resembles sending a fIre engine to fight a fire rather than preventing that fIre in the 
first place' .16 
Reforming Australia!s anti-discrimination law in the ways suggested above 
will not dramatically reconceptualise the existing system. It will remain reactive 
rather than proactive, negative rather than positive, and still fit O'Cinneide's 
description. Positive duties to promote equality were introduced in Britain and 
Northern Ireland to overcome these limitations,l1 and they are presently U1~der 
consideration in Australia.7~ Positive duties require public authorities to have due 
regard to promoting equality of opportunity in carrying out their functions.") An 
individual victim is not .required to take action; the duty attaches to the actions of 
public authorities regardless, forcing them to promote· equality in their decision-
making and policies. 
These criticisms of the individual enforcement model do not imply that there is 
no role for individual complaints in addressing discrimination; it is necessary to 
provide a mechanism for individual victims to resolve their complaint and obtain 
redress. lndeed, the United Kingdom retained the individual complaints system; 
positive duties operate concurrently. However, it must be acknowledged that 
individual complaints are capable of having minimal effect on eradicating 
discrimination in society. 
7S 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Smith (2006). p 723ff. See a1so the enforcement pyramid in Hepple et al (lOOO), Ch 3. 
O'Cinneide (2003), p 21. 
There is a wealth of commentary and evaluative material on positive duties. See, for 
example, Fredman (2001 ,Z005); O'Cinneide (2005). 
The West Australian Equal Opportunity Commission (2007), p 10 proposed imposing a 
gender equality duty on public employers. The Department of Justice (Victoria) (2008) 
recommended introducing a duty to eliminate discrimination: Recommendation 9. The 
Senate Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committee (2008) recommended that 
further consideration be .given to introducing a positive duty on public sector 
organjsation, employers, educational Institutions and other service providers: 
Recommendation 40. 
Sec, for example~ Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK), s 75. 
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Conclusion 
Parties settle discrimination complaints for valid reasons that also apply in other 
areas of law) such as the time and energy it takes to pursue or defend acomplaint~ 
and the publicity associated with litigation. Representatives revealed that they 
advised complainants to settle due to the risk ofa lower compensation award if they 
were successful compared with what they could negotiate prior to hearing. It is also 
clear from tlns discussion that, although complainants cOIisider a tangeof outcomes 
such as equal opportunity training and apologies, complaints are predonllnant1y 
settled with compensation. The development of anti-discrimination law has 
stagnated) even though - as thisarticie shows - there are options avallable for 
improving its effectiveness. It is for this reason that the findings of this study are 
consistent with those of earlier studies. To change thls, it is necessary to address 
persistent problems with the iaw and implement a pro~ctive approach to equality 
that $upplements the individual enforcement modeL 
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